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1 There is no universal standard for the way in which audit committees work. 
Although broadly they covered the same activities, the number of formal 
meetings of companies reviewed ranged between 3 and 13 in the year.  
The time taken per meeting also differed considerably.
 Although all audit committee members must be independent non-executives, 
practice differs considerably as to whether the company chairman and/or the 
CEO regularly attend audit committee meetings.
 The documentation supporting audit committee work needs to be managed 
carefully to ensure that the committee members are well-informed, but are not 
so overloaded with information that key points are missed.
 Dealing with regulatory matters takes a great deal of audit committee time. It 
can be useful to schedule a ‘white space’ meeting to discuss broader risk issues.
 Having multiple directorships, and being able to compare practices in different 
companies, is an advantage to audit committee members both in evaluating the 
performance of their committees and in providing strategic advice.
 Audit committee evaluation takes place in a variety of formal and informal 
ways, including interviews and questionnaires, administered internally and by 
external professionals.
 It is very important to non-executives that they feel that they can trust the 
company’s executives. The corollary to this is that in situations where the 
executives are considered less trustworthy, governance might be difﬁcult as 
well-qualiﬁed potential non-executives might be reluctant to join the board.
 There appears to be an expectations gap between how the audit committees 
see their regulatory role and how this is perceived by the media. For example, 
some parts of the media appear to see the audit committee role as the 
prevention and detection of fraud. This view sits uncomfortably with the 
views of audit committee members – in line with regulation – that theirs is an 
oversight function.
 Although audit committee practices differ widely, they appear to evolve to suit 
the companies’ and individuals’ particular contexts. Accordingly, legislation 
to standardise practice might not be useful, indeed, it may be counter 
productive. Given the potential changes to UK regulation that could arise from 
implementing the EU 8th Directive, it is important that this point be made 
explicitly to legislators.
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4Introduction
This paper summarises the discussions of a meeting of the Audit Committee 
Chair Forum held on 15th December 2005 regarding the role and function of 
audit committees. Additionally, it draws upon interviews conducted with six audit 
committee chairmen who are members of the Audit Committee Chair Forum, and 
on a review of a sample of published audit committee reports1.
Between the interviews and the meeting, the views of 11 audit committee 
chairmen, with a wide range of experience in different companies, were 
obtained. In addition, the meeting solicited the views of three audit partners and 
a company chairman.
The role of the audit committee
“[The purpose of the audit committee] is to help managers risk-manage the 
business, and within that process to apply the necessary standard of governance. 
It has to be relevant to the ongoing management of the business.”
The role of the audit committee is laid out in the Combined Code (2003) and 
expanded upon in the Smith Guidance (2003). A brief summary of these duties 
is set out at Appendix 1. All of the audit committees represented in this work 
carried out all of these functions, and often had further responsibilities, for 
example a review of the company’s CSR (corporate social responsibility) policies. 
Although the basic role of the audit committee was the same for all companies, 
each committee conducted its business in very different ways. In some companies 
the whole of the risk assessment of the business was under the remit of the audit 
committee; others had separate committees dealing with, for example, health and 
safety, or risk. The structure of the board and its committees, and the remit of the 
audit committee, were speciﬁc to the context of the company.
It was agreed by all participants that the audit committee role is to oversee rather 
than to manage. Their role is twofold: supporting and advising management 
alongside acting as a governance body. 
1 The interviews were performed by Dr Ruth Bender, Dr Ashley Braganza and Dr Arnoud Franken of Cranﬁeld School of Management. They were 
carried out between 23rd August and 24th November 2005. Interviews, conducted by two or all three of the interviewers, lasted between 50 
and 100 minutes, and were taped and tran scribed. The ﬁve  published audit committee reports that were reviewed were selected at random 
from FTSE 100 companies. All of the quotations in this report come from audit committee chairmen, either at interview or at the Audit 
Committee Chair Forum meeting.
5Audit committee meetings
Although the audit committees appeared to cover similar agendas, the level of 
engagement and the way in which the tasks were carried out differed considerably 
between companies.
Number and duration of meetings
The Smith Guidance suggests that the number of audit committee meetings in a 
year should be no fewer than three. Of the companies reviewed in this research, 
the minimum number of meetings was three, and the maximum number of 
meetings found during the research was the 13 reported by BP plc2. The number 
of meetings will in part be a function of unusual circumstances during the year 
(eg. initial application of Sarbanes-Oxley or international ﬁnancial reporting 
standards); however discussion showed that different companies do have a 
different number of ‘standard’ meetings scheduled for the year.
Meetings generally last between 2 and 3 hours, although one audit committee 
chairman reported knowing of a company where the audit committee meetings 
regularly lasted between 4 and 6 hours.
In reading the published reports of audit committees and their terms of reference 
it is difﬁcult to see why some committees can conduct their formal business 
in about 8-10 hours per year, and others take 30-40 hours. As an example, the 
published reports of Cadbury Schweppes plc (4 meetings per year) and BP plc  
(13 meetings) have been compared in Appendix 2. It will be seen that both 
companies covered the same agenda, although obviously the style and detail must 
differ. These differences will be driven to some extent by the companies’ context 
and industry, and partly by the personalities and preferences of those concerned, 
particularly the audit committee chairmen.
Attendance of executives at audit committee meetings
“The risk of the [company] chairman attending is that he exerts the influence even 
though he’s not a member: if he’s not in the room, then it’s easy.”
The Combined Code states that the audit committee members should comprise 
independent non-executives, and not include the company chairman. However, 
audit committee meetings were attended by many parties other than the actual 
members: external and internal auditors, and the chairman and members of the 
executive being the main such attendees.
Finance directors (FD) generally attended the meetings; practice as to attendance 
of other executives differed considerably. From our interviews and discussions 
2 The research did not include a systematic review of the published audit committee reports of all listed companies, and so no conclusion can be 
drawn that 13 is the highest number of audit committee meetings in a year.
6we found that in some companies it was common practice for both a company’s 
chairman and its CEO to attend all or the majority of audit committee meetings 
(albeit that they, and the FD, would leave for part of the meeting so that the 
non-executives could discuss matters privately with the auditors). However, the 
attendance of the chairman and/or CEO at audit committee meetings was by no 
means universal. In some companies, either or both of them attended often, but 
by invitation only. In other companies the CEO and company chairman did not 
attend the audit committee meeting, which was seen as having mainly a non-
executive governance function.
On the other hand, in one company the whole board – executive and non-
executive – attended the audit committee meetings, which were seen as an 
integral part of the risk management function of the company. All corporate 
governance matters were dealt with at these meetings.
A stated advantage of having the key executives attend the audit committee 
meetings is that they have a great deal to contribute, and they get to see what 
issues are concerning the non-executives (“reading the body language” at the 
meeting). A stated disadvantage is that a powerful chairman or CEO may hijack 
the meeting to his or her own agenda, or may dominate the discussion.
Supporting papers
“It’s the dilemma of the American 20-F. It’s comprehensive rather 
than comprehensible.”
The audit committee chairman has detailed input into the preparation of papers 
for the meetings. 
It was generally agreed that papers that are too detailed are “comprehensive 
rather than comprehensible”, and that by “hiding behind transparency” 
management can actually overload the non-executive directors (NEDs) with 
detail and thus – deliberately or otherwise – obscure important matters. One 
committee chairman commented that as the volume of documentation had grown 
with new regulation, his job, and the job of the ﬁnance team, in preparing it had 
increased considerably.
From our interviews and discussions it emerged that one of the important roles 
of the audit committee chairman is to ensure that management summarises the 
papers adequately for the committee members. However, the general view of best 
practice was that the audit committee chairman should ensure that all committee 
members do get all of the relevant papers and not just summaries thereof. (This 
view was not necessarily universal. In at least one committee only a summary 
was distributed for some papers.)
Although proper discussion can only take place if committee members have read 
all of the relevant papers in advance of the meeting, it was agreed that not all 
papers distributed for an audit committee meeting needed to be read in detail. 
For example, some committee members might only read summaries of detailed 
statutory ﬁlings. However, it was agreed that the audit committee chairman 
should read all of the material.
7Creating space to think
“How do you make sure… that you’re not missing the potentially big risks?”
“…there is the danger that some boards will be so mesmerised by the process 
of regulation that they’re not thinking creatively and positively; that must be 
a danger.”
In addition to the necessary ‘process’ matters for committee consideration, 
in one of the committees there was a speciﬁc time set aside as “white space” 
– free time to think broadly about company risks. The reason for making 
this time was a belief that audit committees, especially those which have to 
comply with Sarbanes-Oxley, are becoming too process-driven. Given this, 
it is important not to lose sight of the big issues. One of the Audit Committee 
Chair Forum participants ensured that his committee always had “white space” 
time. Others at the meeting thought that this could be a useful event, although 
no others speciﬁcally followed it. In one company such issues were taken up at 
board away-days, and in one other they were discussed twice a year at a private 
dinner of the non-executives, held under the chairmanship of the SID (senior 
independent director).
One audit committee chairman noted that there was no time in his company 
for such “white space” meetings, as most of the year had been taken up with 
Sarbanes-Oxley compliance! This comment does reﬂect the time management 
problems faced by NEDs as their regulatory workload becomes more demanding.
Effectiveness of the audit committee
“...the danger of over-regulation is that it becomes a box-ticking exercise, rather 
than giving thought to the bigger picture and understanding the business better 
and the people better. Regulation is no substitute for that, and sometimes you can 
spend too much time going through the checklist and not enough time using your 
judgement.”
As stated earlier, the work of the audit committee is twofold, and involves 
both ensuring ‘Conformance’ to governance regulation and encouraging 
‘Performance’ by advising management. This is a broad remit, often with little 
tangible output. Accordingly, it can be difﬁcult to assess how effective the 
committee is.
Evaluation of the audit committee
The Combined Code states that there should be an annual evaluation of the 
performance of the board and its committees. In the companies reviewed, this 
was done in a variety of ways, both formally and informally, using questionnaires 
and interviews, and using internal and external assessors. However, the 
participants agreed that it can be difﬁcult to establish clearly whether an audit 
committee is doing a good job. 
8One part of the evaluation process is to take the views of the external auditors, 
who are considered to be experts, as they have the chance to observe many such 
committees in action. However, it was noted that at times an auditor may not 
be totally frank with a poorly-performing audit committee chairman, given the 
commercial relationship that exists. Accordingly, it might be appropriate for the 
audit committee evaluation to be conducted by the company chairman rather than 
the chairman of the audit committee.
Evidence discussed by the interviewees to support their judgement on the 
effectiveness of the committee and their trust in the executives included: the 
conduct of committee and board meetings; no one person dominating meetings; 
the ability to receive papers that were complete and on time; the ability to bring 
matters to board or committee meetings and to have free discussion; etc. Broadly 
this can be summarised by one interviewee’s comments that he was satisﬁed 
because “there are no impediments to me doing my job”.
Role of the audit committee chairman
In committees of any sort, the role played by the chairman is critical in setting  
the tone and structure of the work. It has been seen that the conduct of audit 
committees can differ considerably, and one reason for this will be the personal 
style of the audit committee chairman. Indeed, a couple of our interviewees 
who sit on several committees commented that those committees do operate in 
different ways.
One obvious role for the audit committee chairman is to determine what 
gets discussed, how and in what depth. All of the audit committee chairman 
participating in this research were involved in determining the agendas for the 
audit committee meetings generally in conjunction with the FD, sometimes 
with the external auditor. Some had a policy of always meeting with the external 
auditor before a committee meeting but this was not universal practice. 
Relationships 
“If I didn’t trust the company directors I would not be an audit committee 
chairman – I think you’re on a loser in every way you can think of. I’d only join a 
company where I felt that they had integrity – which is absolutely the answer you 
don’t want. If you are a government you actually want people like me; you actually 
want us on [boards] in places where we can do the most good.”
In assessing the effectiveness of an audit committee, many of the respondents 
discussed the nature of the relationships between members of the committee, 
and between committee members and the executives. It was generally agreed 
that trust between executives and NEDs is essential, and that governance cannot 
operate properly if that trust breaks down. Indeed, this level of trust (or, as one 
participant stated, “trust with veriﬁcation”) is an important criterion mentioned 
in evaluating the performance of the committee and the board.
9Given that (anecdotally) there are fewer qualiﬁed individuals prepared to join 
the boards of companies as NEDs, due both to the increased time commitment 
and the increased threat of litigation, it seems likely from the above that these 
individuals will concentrate their talents in the good companies. However, it is 
the not-so-good companies who really need their governance abilities – and who 
are likely to have to settle for NEDs with lesser abilities.
In all of the committees referred to, the chairmen stated that they had good 
relationships with the external auditors, as well as with people inside the 
company such as the FD and the internal auditor3. 
NEDs with multiple directorships
“There’s no doubt that if you’ve picked a problem up and dealt with it in one 
company and it comes up in another company, you’re better informed. And one 
of the things I’ve found, going to multiple boards, is that …whatever’s on one 
company agenda tends to be on the next company agenda.”
Regarding board and committee evaluation, many of the interviewees and 
contributors commented on the advantage to a NED of sitting on more than 
one board. 
Although in the past concerns have been raised regarding the time that can be 
spent by individuals with multiple directorships, and the narrow demographic of 
having the same people as non-executives in many companies, it does produce 
some beneﬁts. By participating in more than one board, NEDs can contrast the 
processes and outcomes in different companies, and discuss ‘best practice’ with 
their peers, who have experience in further companies. 
NEDs with multiple directorships also bring additional experience to their 
committees. An example noted at the Audit Committee Chair Forum was 
the ability to discuss disaster recovery processes in the context of what other 
companies did. 
Some interviewees have commented that the increased regulatory burden may 
mean that individuals hold fewer non-executive directorships, which could have a 
negative impact on their overall effectiveness. 
3 Given the voluntary nature of participation in both the interviews and the Forum meeting, this is not surprising.  It is unlikely that individuals 
who were experiencing problems in this area would make themselves available for interview.
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Expectations gap
“I think you’re there to minimise the chances of [fraud], reduce the chances of it. 
I don’t think you’re there to stop it. It’s not possible… My guess is that there are 
two communities. There are the informed and the uninformed. And the informed 
probably realise that it’s not possible to stop fraud. But I think the average person 
in the street probably will assume that it is.”
“…with the scandals in America, there’s a risk that people see the audit committee 
as the ultimate auditor. …The risk is that they’re seen as the people who overall 
could control what the company puts in the public domain, and the way in which 
the company’s financial systems are run. And I don’t see that to be the case. You 
are talking about …four or five people who spend say twenty days a year on the 
company’s business; three half-days of which are in audit committee. And they 
don’t have the knowledge of the audit firm which is in there for millions of pounds 
worth of fees, or the CFO and his team who are there on a day-to-day basis.”
The term ‘expectations gap’ refers to instances where the legal responsibilities 
of a board or committee are at odds with the public expectations of those bodies. 
For example, a common view in the media, and of some smaller shareholders, 
appears to be that the audit committee is there to prevent fraud.
The general view of those interviewed was that in practice the audit committee 
is unlikely to be able to prevent and detect fraud, and that this has not changed 
with recent regulation. By its very nature, the committee is at a distance from the 
operations of the business. 
Thus there is a gap between what the committee members believe they can 
achieve, and what part of the outside world sees as their role. This is not an 
expectations gap with the majority owners of the company, the institutional 
shareholders, but with the some of the opinion-formers. As such, the gap 
needs to be deﬁned (as between the media, shareholders, regulators, etc.) and 
then addressed. In deﬁning the gap it is important to understand that it may 
refer not just to the audit committee but to the organisation more broadly: the 
outside world may not differentiate between management, the board and the 
audit committee.
Potential changes to regulation
The Audit Committee Chair Forum considered the potential implications of 
changes to UK legislation or regulations following the implementation of the EU 
8th Directive on statutory audit. There is the potential for any country to opt out 
of the Directive’s statutory requirement for an audit committee: the government’s 
solution in the Company Law Reform Bill is that the FSA be responsible for audit 
committees and corporate governance. The CBI position is that this should be an 
FRC responsibility following their present ownership of corporate governance 
under the combined code.
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The meeting felt that this would be an unsatisfactory outcome. Given the wide 
variations in audit committee practice that have been noted in this research, 
and the desire for audit committees to serve a useful function in the context of 
their individual company circumstances, standardisation of practice was not 
considered to be useful. 
A further regulatory issue discussed at the meeting was the move by some 
institutional shareholders and their representatives to have closer involvement 
with audit committees than they do now. Currently, the Combined Code states 
that audit committee chairmen should be available at companies’ AGMs to 
answer shareholder questions, but gives investors no direct access other than that. 
The view of the participants at the meeting was that no beneﬁt would be gained 
by allowing increased access. The issue is: does the audit committee exist for the 
beneﬁt of the board, or for the beneﬁt of the shareholders? Generally, the view 
was that it was the former: the audit committee is a sub-committee of the board to 
which certain responsibilities are delegated, and its role is to report to that board. 
Conclusion
“How much of the time of the audit committee is directed towards non-productive 
work designed to protect you if you get sued?”
“Is it the job of the directors to ensure that the company doesn’t do anything 
it shouldn’t do, or is it the job of the directors to ensure that the company does 
everything that it could?”
The audit committee is a sub-committee of the board, with its remit normally 
including monitoring the integrity of the company’s internal control systems 
and its published ﬁnancial information. As well as undertaking its activities in 
accordance with governance regulation, audit committee chairs stated a desire 
that the committee should add value to the company.
The growing volume of governance regulation, and the related increased legal 
obligations of the non-executives, can lead to too much focus on process, or “box-
ticking”, and too little time spent on value-adding activities, including thinking 
creatively about risk management. One way to avoid this narrow focus is to 
schedule time over the year for “white space” thinking.
A perceived strength of the system is the fact that non-executives sit on the 
boards and committees of more than one company. This enables them to contrast 
processes between companies, evaluate performance, and contribute to strategic 
discussion by bringing in experience from other contexts.
All of the companies reviewed in this research were compliant with regulation. 
However, the audit committees were run in very different ways, which the 
participants believed reﬂected the differing circumstances of companies as well 
as the preferences of the individuals. This was seen as a strength of the system 
– if a committee is to add value to the organisation, ﬂexibility is needed in its 
approach. Any further legislation or regulation in the UK or Europe needs to take 
this into account. One size does not ﬁt all.
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Questions to ask yourself
 What could your audit committee achieve if it had one extra meeting  
each year?
 Would your audit committee beneﬁt from “white space”, a separate meeting to 
consider risks to the company? Do time constraints make this feasible?
 What does your audit committee do that you think is unnecessary, or could 
better be done in another part of the company or board?
 If you sit on more than one audit committee, what differences are there in the 
way that they operate? Could the practices of one usefully be adopted  
by another?
 Who attends your audit committee meetings and what inﬂuence, positive or 
negative, do they have on the decisions that are made and the risks that  
are considered?
 Are preparatory papers for your audit committee comprehensive rather than 
comprehensible? If so, what needs to happen to make them more useful?
 Our results suggest that a high degree of trust between NEDs and executives is 
essential for governance mechanisms to work properly. Do you agree? Do you 
have such a relationship on the boards on which you sit? If not, what needs to 
be done to improve the situation?
 How do you evaluate the effectiveness of your audit committee? Whose role 
should it be to undertake that evaluation?
 How do you manage the expectations gap between what the committee 




The role of the audit committee
Summary of audit committee role from the Combined Code
 To monitor integrity of the ﬁnancial statements.
 To review the company’s internal ﬁnancial controls (and its risk management 
systems unless monitored elsewhere).
 To monitor and review the effectiveness of internal audit.
 To recommend (to the board) appointment of the external auditor, and approve 
their remuneration and terms of engagement.
 To review and monitor the external auditor’s independence, objectivity and the 
effectiveness of the audit process.
 To develop and implement policy on using the external auditor to supply non-
audit services.
 To review whistle-blowing arrangements for staff.
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Appendix 2
Activities undertaken by audit committees
The following table contrasts (in summary form) the published audit committee reports of Cadbury 
Schweppes plc and BP plc. It shows that similar activities appear to be undertaken by each company, 
but that these are conducted over four meetings in Cadbury Schweppes, and over 13 meetings in BP. 
Cadbury Schweppes BP
Number of audit committee meetings in 2004
Four meetings 13 meetings (increased from nine in 2003)
Work done on published ﬁnancial statements
 2003 full year result announcement, annual review, summary 
ﬁnancial statement, report and accounts, 20-F, report from 
the external auditor.
 2004 interim report.
 Dealing with IFRS and other accounting issues.
 Reviewed all annual and quarterly ﬁnancial reports, in 
particular looking at signiﬁcant accounting policies , 
estimates and judgements.
Work done on internal audit, internal control, risk assessment
 2003 full year report on internal audit and effectiveness of 
internal control.
 Reviewing internal audit processes and the audit plan 
for 2005.
 Monitoring the group’s risk management and business 
ethics processes.
 Annual report of group legal matters.
 Security arrangements for IT.
 Preparation for Sarbanes-Oxley.
 Group’s response to corporate governance developments in 
the UK and US.
 Speciﬁc reports on risk management and internal 
control were considered.
 Considers the internal auditors’ programme and its 
effectiveness twice a year.
 Received separate reports regarding the group’s 
environmental and decommissioning provisions, tax 
exposures, pension assumptions and the status of 
current litigation.
 Response to Sarbanes-Oxley.
External auditor
 Provision and scope of audit and non-audit work by external 
auditor.
 External audit fees for 2003 and 2004.
 Reviews independence, objectivity and viability of the 
auditors, and pre-approves any non-audit services 
provided by the auditors.
 Reviewed audit fees. (This is stated in the Report and 
Accounts, not the audit committee report.)
Whistle-blowing
 Introduction of group whistle-blowing policy.  Received regular reports raised through the whistle 
blowing programme.
Audit committee review
 Annual review of the effectiveness of the audit committee.  Critically reviews its own performance.


